

# Bandwidth Overload Avoidance using D-CAF

A Distributed, Context Aware Firewall

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# Overview


- .Background: Autonomic Networking
- .Application: Overload avoidance
- .Architecture
- .Key Concepts
- .Outlook: Context Valuation Framework

# Autonomic Networking



- .Computer Networks are growing ever more complex
- .Self-Managing components need less configuration
  - They reconfigure to follow high-level policies
  - Autonomic nerve system: react without brain control
- .Context Awareness allows local decisions and collaboration
  - Information is prepared by the specialized components
  - Exchange allows local decisions to follow global policies.

# Application

- Protection of network services (Firewall)
- Against abusive DDoS
- Against legitimate overload
- (These do not actually differ)





# Conventional Solution



# Autonomic Approach: D-CAF

Each service may send subjective valuations of each user (IP address)

“IP 1.2.3.4 has (for me) a value of 0.65”  
in a range of [-1.0;1.0]




# Autonomic Approach: D-CAF

- .Services send subjective usage valuations of the users.
- .The D-CAF system
  - collects these valuations
  - Monitors the total traffic, and traffic flows
- .Only in case of overload, a decision has to be made:
  - We need to filter something to keep our services available
- .The policy is to filter the worst valuated IP addresses
  - until the traffic is estimated to be within processable range.


# Scenario: Normal usage

- .Total traffic count < Available Bandwidth
  - Attack or not – we can handle it
- .Services report usage valuations
  - User logged in with password → +0.8
  - Failed login attempt → -0.1
  - Regular browsing pattern → +0.5
  - Customer completed buying → +1.0
  - Repeatedly loading single site → -0.5
  - Attempt to log into database server → -0.9
  - ...

# Usage report aggregation




# Per-Flow Traffic Measurement




# Scenario: Attack/Overload

- .Total traffic count  $\geq$  Available Bandwidth
- .We must filter – the least useful addresses first



# Scenario: Attack/Overload


- .Total traffic count **still**  $\geq$  Available Bandwidth
- .We must filter – the least useful addresses first



# Scenario: Attack/Overload


.Total traffic count < Available Bandwidth

.We have filtered **enough**




# D-CAF: Distributed Context-Aware Firewall


### Value by IP




### Traffic per Flow



### Total Traffic



### Filters



Received Packets : 92 Total Octetcount : 62856.0 Total Filters : 117

Threshold (KB/s):  Firewall Update Period (secs):

# Extending the context


.Valuation Reports are

- Semantically concise; subjective
- They can easily be exchanged in similar contexts
- Just as well in aggregated form
- “My neighbour thinks...”

.DDoS Attacks are

- Distributed (zombies)
- Highly similar (simple)
- Using same resources (infected hosts)

# Extending the context



# Outlook

- .Currently tested: Single instance DDoS defense
- Setup a larger distributed reporting network
- e.g. in the Onelab2 distributed testbed

## **In Autonomic Networking**

- .Can be extended to other contexts:
- IP address = identification = UserID; ServiceID; ...
- Traffic/Value = Cost/Value = universal
- .Generalization: Context Valuation Framework

# Thank you!

- Questions? -

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