Intro Fun





Security & Trust

Trends on security and trust within the Internet – A focus on Phishing trends and some solutions

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- In the past several months a series of highly sophisticated and targeted cyber attacks has revealed a shift in the threat arena and their persistence on networks (APT buzz)
- Attackers are moving beyond schemes to acquire financial data (such as credit cards and identity theft) and are pursuing highvalue digital assets such as intellectual property, access to critical operations, and other proprietary data systems
- We are involved with businesses in attempt to review possible strategies and validation of business models that aim to offer mitigation against a portion of this space.



- Most recent compromises that are reported use a technique called social engineering
- Defined social engineering is using deception, manipulation, and influence to convince a human who has access to a computer system to do something, such as click on an attachment or a link in an email
- Social-engineering schemes historically use spoofed e-mails purporting to be from legitimate businesses and agencies to lead consumers to counterfeit websites designed to trick recipients into divulging financial data such as usernames and passwords.
- Recent attacks now bundle this method via spear phishing, which leads to a much more targeted attack; in order to access to a key person's workstation, data, etc.



- Phishing is a mechanism that employs both social engineering and malicious means to steal identity & financial account credentials
- Defined Phishing is the act of tricking someone into surrendering private information over the Internet, follows the idea of actual fishing — you throw out bait with the hopes that while some ignore it, others will bite.
 - Traditional attacks mimic financial sites to collect credit card data
 - Attacks most commonly come in the form of emails or messages that contain viral links.
- Recent trends show an increase of compromises that use techniques to allow an attacker access to a key person



Increased Effectiveness - Social Networking



- Social Networks make it easy....one can go into Twitter,
 Facebook, LinkedIn, etc. to search for someone or use current
 events to lure recipients to react to a communication
- Online communities are powerful, trusted and perfect for cyber crime to leverage such relationships
 - Social networking attacks leverage a trusted link between friends, either to deliver malware or to phish for confidential and financial information.
 - Easier for attackers to spread malicious software through links, photos and applications because those users are typically more trusting







- At the end of 2010, nearly 85 percent of recorded phishing attempts used social networks as a lure, up from 8.3 percent at the start of the year
- Tiny URLs have also enabled better hiding of phishing domains from users. Phishing detection software generally looks for HTML-based content, hence some attacks are using Flash, JavaScript and MIME type content that autocorrects to HTML in browsers for success





Phishing Trends – Reports 2H2010



• Phishing reports submitted to APWG during the second half 2010



Statistics sourced from APWG Global Phishing Survey 2H2010 (April 2011). Data and examples contained herein are provided for informative use only.



- Phishing Trends Sites Detected 2H2010
 - Sites reported to APWG reached the highest point in September 2010



Statistics sourced from APWG Global Phishing Survey 2H2010 (April 2011). Data and examples contained herein are provided for informative use only.

Trends -2H2010



• Phishing Trends per APWG (member report):

	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
Number of unique phishing email reports received by APWG from consumers	26,353	25,273	22,188	23,619	23,017	21,020
Number of unique phishing web sites detected	30,582	29,713	31,705	28,985	29,226	26,124
Number of brands hijacked by phishing campaigns	274	301	335	317	305	279
Country hosting the most phishing websites	Sweden	Sweden	Sweden	USA	USA	USA
Contain some form of target name in URL	82.82%	95.13%	92.94%	79.93%	76.44%	75.86%
No hostname; just IP address	1.45%	0.84%	1.93%	3.89%	15.11%	3.05%
Percentage of sites not using port 80	0.12%	0.10%	0.23%	0.60%	0.43%	0.48%



- Phishing trends saw a global increase (vs APWG member rpt)
 - Average site uptime 73 hours (longest measurement)
 - Age of site ? (turnaround currently reviewing)

	2H2010	1H2010	2H2009	1H2009	2H2008
Phishing					
domain names	42,624	28,646	28,775	30,131	30,454
Attacks	67,677	48,244	126,697	55,698	56,959
TLDs used	183	177	173	171	170
IP-based phish					
(unique IPs)	2,318	2,018	2,031	3,563	2,809
Maliciously					
registered					
domains	11,769	4,755	6,372	4,382	5,591
IDN domains	10	10	12	13	10

Trends 2H-2010



• Phishing Attacks by TLD:



All Phishing Attacks, by TLD 2H2010

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Trends Q2-2011



• Phishing Attacks by TLD:

PHISHING BY TLD - Q2 2011



Statistics sourced from APWG Global Phishing Survey 2H2010 (April 2011). Data and examples contained herein are provided for informative use only.



- Methodology generally ineffective against antivirus clients given lag in detection rates (cat & mouse)
- Malware Detection Rates by AV Vender (2010):

	Trend									Virus		eTrust-	
	Micro	Sophos	McAfee	Kaspersky	F-Secure	Dr Web	AVG	Nod32	F-Prot	Buster	Norman	Vet	Symantec
Day 1	17%	20%	22%	22%	27%	7%	13%	37%	17%	10%	17%	16%	21%
Day 8	29%	36%	53%	87%	50%	29%	85%	86%	23%	30%	29%	21%	36%
Day 15	32%	75%	85%	91%	59%	33%	92%	88%	34%	46%	31%	27%	43%
Day 22	32%	81%	86%	92%	62%	33%	92%	88%	37%	74%	32%	29%	46%
Day 30	38%	85%	86%	92%	64%	33%	93%	89%	39%	74%	32%	30%	47%

Methods of the Attack

- Reconnaissance to build knowledge of organization/-target
- Social engineering and/or spear phishing to target end users
- Exploitation of vulnerabilities at end point
- Expand to peer relationships to roam the network
- Escalation of privileges / rights
- Additional spear phishing or decrypting
- Administrators' passwords
- Compromise of internal systems
- Exfiltration of data or other
- Cleanup









Examples of the Typical Attack

- Earthquake (Haiti / Chile)
- Japan Earthquake & Tsunami
- Chilean miners
- Poland President
- Gulf oil spill
- Michael Jackson













 "Is this a video of you? <link>" sent from a trusted friend to a circle of friends quickly infects new systems to propagate to the next layer of friends



twitter

Hi, David Snyder.

You have a new direct message:



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elizabethgeorge: rofl this you on here? http://videos.twitter.secure-logins01.com

Reply on the web at <u>http://twitter.com/direct_messages/create/elizabethgeorge</u> Send me a direct message from your phone: D ELIZABETHGEORGE

Another Possible Example



• Security Question – Password Update:



Recent Sophisticated Examples



- Most recent sophisticated compromises reportedly used spear phishing which allowed the attacker access to a key person's workstation:
- IMF: International Monetary Fund (IMF): 2011 attack gained access via spear phishing employee
- Google: Early 2010 Attackers were able to install spyware on the resilient networks by manipulating key employees who had access to sensitive data to click on malicious links that exploited an Internet Explorer zero-day vulnerability. The attacks were timed for the holidays when IT administration is thinly staffed to cover operations.
- Q1 RSA SecurID data compromise occurred when an RSA employee clicked on a malware link in an apparent communication from a Human Resources department.





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Q: How many of our users would fall prey to a spear-phishing attack?

Q: Would attackers be able to hijack admin accounts?

Recent examples raise questions about important web defense strategies such as protecting remote users and office-based workers through 24/7 security...



Do Current Efforts Make Sense?



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What Do We Do?



- Everything There is no one solution
- Need to use a mix of user education and layered security solutions to defend the networks
- Employees should treat emails with suspicion and IT teams should leverage multiple resources (AV, IDS, User Restrictions)
- Some other ideas:
 - Products that send phishing emails to your employees safely and easily trains your employees immediately when they fall for an attack
 - Gathers actionable data to finely target future employee training and how to avoid the ever evolving threat on the Internet.
 - Complete formal spear phishing awareness training
 - Separate corporate and open systems create an "air gap"
 - If data exfiltration is discovered, collect intelligence such as: What did they take, Where was the vector, How Long, Did they Leave, Where was it sent

Mitigation Examples



• User Training Examples:



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 The real issue isn't the type of mechanism being used to target victims, It's that users are simply not learning how to avoid being tricked on the Internet

Our Pending Solution – "Guidon"

• Understanding that when information is shared by a user the victim knows, attackers assume (generally correctly) that the attempt will be more successful

- Example 1: You see a message from a friend or a link on your Facebook news feed. You click on it only to find...... common scams

- Example 2: You continue to get messages from your father/friends

- Edgemount Solutions Pending Tool Development:
 - Leverage historical metadata analysis for trend
 - Global IP Country location
 - Mail Client Proxy service (known or unknown)
 - Time of message
 - Age of IP Domain
 - Trend based on historical dates
 - Various modes: Grandparent, Parent, Technical User, Kids





References & Various Resources



- APWG (www.antiphishing.org/index.html)
- MAAWG (www.maawg.org/)
- McAfee Security Trends & Reports (www.mcafee.com/us/mcafee-labs/threatintelligence.aspx)
- Verizon / Verizon Business Security (securityblog.verizonbusiness.com)
- Microsoft Security Center (www.microsoft.com/security)
- Wombat Security Technologies (www.wombatsecurity.com/contact)
- Carnegie Mellon University (cups.cs.cmu.edu/anti)



Other Fun





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